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DENNIS H Y A l T  
THERELATIONSHIP OF public lending right (PLR) legislation to the law 
o f  copyright is the central legal issue in the development of the PLR 
concept. Parties to the PLRdebate cannot be clearly divided by how they 
view this relationship; however, most proponents of a public lending 
right contend that PLR legislation is an integral part of copyright law, 
while opponents maintain that PLR legislation is hardly a considera- 
tion of copyright law at all. In only one of the ten countries toenact PLR 
legislation has the statute been madea part of copyright law. In the nine 
other countries, proponents have, in effect, won the PLR battle but lost 
the main legal point on which they based their attack. In short, regard- 
less of the apparently unconvincing legal basis of their position, advo- 
cates of PLR have nonetheless gained support in these countries because 
the concept addresses the perceived problem of lending library activities 
undermining the livelihood of the authors who create the books loaned. 
Two approaches are used to solve the problem of whether PLR 
legislation is appropriately considered a part of copyright law. The  first 
approach is analysis of the basic theoretical framework of copyright law 
and the relationship of PLR to that framework. The second approach is 
analysis of the practical consequences of deciding that PLR is an 
integral part of copyright law. The theoretical and practical analyses are 
reviewed here in recognition of the double-sided dilemma confronting 
the PLR adversaries. One one side of the dilemma are the proponents 
who, to enhance the acceptance of PLR legislation, point to the insepa- 
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rably close relationship of PLR to two underlying principles o f  copy-
right law. Their theoretical arguments are not without merit. However, 
the linking of PLR legislation to general copyright law, as a practical 
consequence, in fact diminishes or defeats some of PLR’s major social 
aims in the country in which legislation is enacted. On the other side of 
the dilemma, opponents of PLR legislation, in denying the relation- 
ship of PLR to copyright law, have not thereby convincingly argued 
that PLR legislation as a practical matter is unwarranted or unneces- 
sary. The  history of the legal development of PLR, therefore, is a story of 
slow acceptance of specialized social legislation passed in recognition 
that lending libraries in the latter half of this century may be affecting 
the compensation authors receive for their writings, but without a 
corresponding acceptance of the major legal principle on which that 
legislation is premised. 
National Differences in Copyright Laws 
In the closing chapter of his treatise on U.S. copyright law, Melville 
Nimmer noted: 
The  subject matter of copyright under most foreign copyright laws is 
largely the same as the subject matter under the United States Copy- 
right Ac t . Thus, all members of the Universal Copyright Convention 
undertake to provide adequate and effective protection for “literary, 
scientific and artistic works, including writings, musical, dramatic 
and cinematographic works, and paintings, engravings, and sculp- 
ture.’’Similarily, the “literaryand artistic works” protected under the 
Berne Convention are said to “include every production in the liter- 
ary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the form of its 
expression.. ..I , ’  
He also stated: “The rights protected under most foreign copyright laws 
are in broad outline quite similar to those which may be claimed under 
the U.S. Act. That  is the rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribu- 
tion, and performance, as recognized under the U.S. Copyright Act, all 
have counterparts in foreign copyright laws.”’ 
However, as Dr. Adolf Dietz stated in the introduction to his 
detailed comparative study of copyright laws in the nations of the 
European Economic Community (EEC): “It must be remembered that 
these copyright laws display not only considerable structural differ- 
ences, attributable to only a small extent to their different ages, but also 
that the matters regulated by these laws are not the same in all cases. For 
example, the copyright laws of some countries refer to matters that are 
regulated in other countries by other means than copyright law, or are 
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not regulated at all.”3 Furthermore, in assessing the interpretation of an 
EEC treaty provision, Dietz, scientific consultant at the Max-Planck 
Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competi- 
tion Law, somewhat grudgingly acknowledges that consideration must 
also be given to the concept that “copyright cannot be evaluated sepa- 
rately from its culturo-political ratio legis.” Indeed, perhaps “the cul- 
ture industry also can be comprehended only on the basis of the 
interdependence of cul turo-poli tical and economico-political objec- 
tives,” which vary from nation to n a t i ~ n . ~  
The basic concepts of copyright law are sufficiently broad to permit 
their generalization without regard to national differences, and they are 
sufficiently complex in application to reveal myriad national variations 
when subjected to closer scrutiny. Nimmer and Dietz do not disagree on 
the nature of copyright law; rather, they do not share the same lens in 
their focus on the question of national differences. 
For the most part, proponents and opponents of the PLRconcept 
have contested the question of the appropriate relationship of copyright 
law and PLR legislation on a theoretical level well above the necessity of 
examining national differences in copyright law. For this reason, these 
differences will not be explored in this review, and the salient features of 
copyright law mentioned later can be applied more or less equally to all 
the nations in which the PLR debate is being waged. 
The fact that the PLR adversaries have debated the issue of PLR in 
the context of a law of copyright which transcends national differences 
does not mean that the cultural, economic and political differences to 
which Dietz refers are not important elements for consideration. The 
varieties of proposed and enacted PLR legislation reflect national dif- 
ferences not only in their existing legal structures, but also in their 
social problems, goals and objectives. Furthermore, it is the cultural and 
economic differences in nations which perhaps provide the impetus for 
successful PLR legislative campaigns in some countries, while the same 
arguments fail in others. For example, in the United Kingdom develop- 
ment of an efficient, heavily used library system is presented as a signifi- 
cant factor contributing to the plight of British authors: “During the 
debate on the Public Lending Right bill in the House of Commons, in 
1973, figures were quoted to show that in 1971 in Holland 18books were 
borrowed for every 12 bought, in the United States 13 for every 14, and in 
the United Kingdom 38 for every 4.”5 As Arthur Jones notes in his 
article, the difference in the Scandinavian countries is the relatively 
small population which provides a limited market for authors writing 
in the vernacular who must compete with the use of translations and 
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second-language publications. Thus, while PLR proponents advocate 
legislation based on an argument in copyright law which transcends 
national differences, they have pressed for reform in those countries 
where the relevant social differences are greatest. 
Natural Justice in Copyright Law 
Advocates for PLR contend that the concept is closely related to the 
underlying principles which form the basic theoretical framework of 
copyright law. One principle to which they point is the source of 
copyright law as a precept of natural justice-specifically, that a crea- 
tion belongs first to its creator: 
Our whole law relating to literary and artistic property is essentially 
an inheritance from England. It seems that from the time “whereof 
the memory of man runneth not to thecontrary,” theauthor’s right to 
his or her manuscript was recognized on principles of natural justice, 
being the product of intellectual labor and as much the author’s own 
property as the substance on which it was written ....[Alges before 
Blackstone, an Irish king had enunciated the same principle in set- 
tling the question of property rights in a manuscript: “to every cow 
her calf.”6 
This underpinning to the copyright law has an important corol- 
lary: the right of literary ownership is not one conferred to authors by 
virtue of legislative enactment. Statutes and regulations have developed 
from the necessity of establishing limitations on the use of literary 
property by persons other than the owner. In 1710 the Statute of Anne7 
became: “the first statuteof all timespecifically to recognize the rightsof 
authors and the foundation of all subsequent legislation on the subject 
of copyright both here and abroad.”8 However, by 1710 the English 
Parliament already recognized the wisdom of limiting the exclusive 
right of publication to a term of years in order to cultivate a body of 
knowledge which would enter the public domain. The Statute of Anne 
limited authors or their assigns to the sole right of publication for 
fourteen years with the privilege of renewal for an additional fourteen 
years if the author were living at the expiration of the term. In other 
words, the exclusive right of ownership did not last in perpetuity, and 
the first embodiment of the principle of natural justice of ownership of 
literary property had strucka balance witha conflicting social objective. 
All copyright legislation since the Statute of Anne represents addi- 
tional responses to cultural change and technological development. 
The older, more widespread, and more universally accepted the 
responses have become, the more they have taken on the character of 
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being a part of the embodiment of natural justice in copyright law. 
Indeed, the right of exclusive reproduction, now considered the heart of 
copyright legislation, could not have been a serious issue until the 
development of moveable type allowed reproduction of works in rela- 
tively large q ~ a n t i t y . ~  
Neither side in the PLR debate offers much more than assertion and 
denial in answering whether PLR is a matter of natural justice. [Jsing 
the art of nomenclature alone, those favoring the idea have seized the 
initiative. “Public lending right” is the popular designation for the 
concept of author compensation for library lending which is used by 
friend and foe alike, even though statutory language generally omits 
this terminology. Proposed legislation elevated to the importance of 
protecting a right may produce an initial predisposition to recognize 
the proposal as a part of natural justice. 
The  foundation for any notion of natural justice is the concept of 
fairness, and an appeal for fairness not only gives validity to intuitive 
reaction to the problems addressed by the PLR idea, but also provides a 
contextual basis for presentation of detailed factual information. Pro- 
ponents of PLR ask for legislative support simply as a matter of fairness 
to authors. Opponents claim that fairness is not so simply discerned 
when other segments and interests of society are considered. There is no  
monopoly of fairness in the PLR debate; and factual detail is not 
conclusive in establishing the economic plight of authors, or the ways 
in which libraries contribute to their economic predicament, or the 
royalty scheme best suited to provide recompense. 
Appealing to a sense of fairness has marked the downfall of the 
natural justice argument that public lending right is appropriately a 
part of copyright law. Whereas the question of whether PLR is a natural 
right of the owners of literary property must be answered either yes or 
no, the question of fairness need not be answered so absolutely. Many 
legislative schemes can satisfy the call for fairness to authors without the 
necessity of amending copyright law. This fact helps resolve the seem- 
ing paradox that, in those nations which have enacted PLR legislation, 
the copyright laws have not been amended even though the theoretical 
basis for the legislation is argued on principles of copyright. Converse- 
ly, opponents o f  PLR are faced with the discomforting prospect of 
winning the theoretical legal arguments but still losing the legislative 
battle on less esoteric grounds. 
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Protection of Tangible Expressions in Copyright Law 
Not all aspects of ownership are included in the theoretical frame- 
work of copyright law. Thus, the principle of ownership in natural 
justice which provides that the author is the first owner of his artistic 
creations must be tempered with a second principle which identifies 
those aspects of ownership specifically within copyright protection. 
This second principle of copyright law extends protection to the author 
only for the tangible expression of his ideas: “Copyright protection 
subsists...in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.’”’ 
Copyright law does not protect against the use of an idea, but rather 
protects the expression of that idea in a tangible form: 
The principle of non-protectability of ideas, long recognized by the 
courts, has been expressly adopted in the current Copyright Act. To 
grant property statw to a mere idea would permit withdrawing the 
idea from the stock of materials which would otherwise be open to 
other authors, thereby narrowing the field of thought open for devel-
opment and exploitation. This, i t  is reasoned, would hinder rather 
than promote the professed purpose of copyright laws ....Indeed, it has 
been said that copyright protection is granted for the very reason it 
may persuade authors to make their ideas freely accessible to the 
public so that they may be used for the intellectual advancement of 
mankind.” 
The U.S. statute states: “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard- 
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such work.”’2 
Once an idea is fixed into a tangible medium of expression, copy- 
right law grants to the creator or his assigns the exclusive right to 
reproduce copies for a term fixed by statute: “In any new Copyright Act 
it might be possible to start bydefiningcopyrightasa right subsistingin 
relation to all original works, meaning by the word ‘original’ the 
product of some person’s skill and/or labour, if fixed so that they can be 
repr~duced . ’”~As part of the bundle of rights which inhere in copyright, 
the owner has the exclusive right not only to reproduce, but also to 
derive from, distribute, perform, or display the copyrighted material. In 
continental Europe there are additional rights, known as droit moral 
(moral right), which include the right to withdraw a publication if it no 
longer expresses the views of the author, the right to be known as the 
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author of a work and to prevent others from claiming authorship, the 
right to deny authorship which has been falsely attributed, and the right 
to prevent alterations to the work. The drozt moral has received little 
attention in the United States, and was not included in the 1976 Copy-
right Act. All countries provide some limitations on theexclusive rights 
of the copyright owner. The  United States, for example, has developed 
the judicial doctrine of “fair use”14 to enable some copying which would 
otherwise be an  infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. 
Each copyright owner has the exclusive right to produce copies of 
the work, a copy being the material object in which the work has been 
tangibly expressed. Using the limited monopoly position afforded by 
copyright, the author is free to exploit his position commercially with 
the sale of copies to others. Sale of a copy of the work conveys n o  
copyright interest to the buyer, and under existing law the author has 
exhausted his economic and legal interest in that copy once it has been 
sold. 
The  lines of argument are clearly drawn on the question of whether 
PLR is appropriately a concern of copyright law based on the principle 
of ownership rights which are traditionally protected. Both sides in the 
controversy acknowledge that authors currently have no €egal claim to 
compensation for the use libraries make of copies of their works unless 
there is specific statutory authorization for compensation, since there is 
no  copying involved and the author has no residual ownership interest 
in the copies purchased by libraries. Opponents of the idea of incorpor-
ating a public lending right into copyright law assert two major points: 
removing the necessity of copying from the conceptual framework of 
copyright is an unwarranted step; and, a1 tering broad social legislation, 
such as copyright law, to correct a specific economic imbalance as may 
exist between libraries and authors, is an inappropriate blunt means of 
achieving a relatively subtle end. 
In addressing the claim that the nature of copyright law necessarily 
involves the exclusive right of reproduction and distribution, propo- 
nents of PLR legislation point to compulsory licensing statutes, such as 
those sections of the Copyright Act which cover phonorecords, retrans- 
missions by cable television systems, and jukeb~xes : ’~  “Essentially, a 
compulsory license is one conferred by statute ...[which] enables others 
to use a copyright work, by copying, performing, displaying, or other- 
wise, without infringement when the user has fulfilled specified condi- 
tions, including the payment of royalties.”’6 In short, copyright law has 
already altered the exclusive right of reproduction and distribution with 
compulsory licensing statutes, and no  new conceptuaI framework is 
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established by including compensation for authors in a similarly 
arranged PLR scheme. Furthermore, the proponents maintain that 
there is no functional difference between the multiple loaning of a 
single copy from a library and the copying of protected works. 
Copyright statutes are no longer just the embodiment of broad 
principles of copyright law, and the 1976 Copyright Act is an example 
of the trend in copyright legislative development: “Where previously 
the statute had too little to say in many vital copyright areas, it may now 
be argued that it says too much. I for one regret this departure from the 
flexibility and pristine simplicity of a corpus of judge-made copyright 
law implanted upon a statutory base consisting of general principles. 
This has now been replaced with a body of detailed rules reminiscent of 
the Internal Revenue Code.”’7 One of the provisions of the new act is 
devoted to library photocopying.” Not only are copyright statutes 
increasing in complexity with the willingness to attempt fine-tuning of 
conflicting social interests, but also the LJ.S. statute has already 
addressed the issue of the impact of library activities. Those who advo- 
cate the inclusion of PLR in copyright law could argue that the more 
detailed the copyright law becomes, the more appropriate additional 
detail becomes. 
Those seeking to adjust the balance of interests between libraries 
and authors might disagree that the task is a minor one. It is a “societal 
policy (funding of ubiquitous lending libraries) that a1 ters the workings 
of the copyright scheme.” Indeed, “the trouble is caused by an activity of 
government-the establishment, funding, and staffing of public 
libraries-in a degree so great that the micro-economic balance of the 
copyright scheme rewards is interfered with....’”’ These remarks from 
Exempt ions  and Fair Use in Copyright by Leon Seltzer, director of 
Stanford University Press, are presented to suggest thata PLR scheme is 
sufficiently important and related to the theoretical framework of copy- 
right principles and legislation that its incorporation into the copyright 
statute is appropriate, as most PLR proponents contend. However, in 
concluding his analysis of the issues surrounding PLR, Seltzer suggests 
that any scheme should be outside the scope of copyright. 
Tactical and Practical Considerations 
There is no  agreement among scholars or PLR adversaries on the 
appropriate relationship of PLR legislation to copyright law. Equally 
valid jurisprudential arguments support opposite conclusions. Fur- 
thermore, those favoring PLR legislation do not necessarily recognize 
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its close relationship to copyright law. Conversely, opposition to PLR 
legislation does not necessarily indicate opposition to a close relation- 
ship. Nonetheless, there are tactical reasons for, and practical conse- 
quences of, asserting that the relationship should appropriately be 
considered a particular way. The quandary confronting all parties in 
the PLR debate is the perverse way in which tactics and practical 
consequences conflict. 
As a tactical matter, supporters of a PLR concept advocate that it is 
an element of copyright law. There are three main reasons for their 
viewpoint. First, being a part of copyright law gives the PLRconcept an 
additional legitimacy to the claim of authors who might otherwise be 
accused of seeking mere social welfare legislation. Second, each nation 
which acknowledges PLR legislation as a part of copyright creates 
pressures for other countries to do the same as a matter of reciprocity 
agreements and copyright treaty. Thus, as an international movement, 
passage of PLR legislation becomes progressively easier even if docu- 
mentation of the economic condition of authors becomes more difficult 
in the separate country. Third, once incorporated into a system of 
copyright, a PLR scheme would be more difficult to repeal than it 
would be as a free-standing piece of legislation. 
There are two tactical disadvantages to claiming that public lend- 
ing right legislation is an integral part of copyright law. First, the 
impetus to revise or amend one of the fundamental laws of a nation may 
take years to generate action. (The experience of the IJnited States in 
revising the Copyright Act of 1909is a case in point.) On the other hand, 
specialized legislation can be urged and enacted at any time. Second, as a 
practical consequence of PLR legislation enacted as a part of copyright 
law, nations are bound by treaty obligation to extend the same rights of 
protection to foreign authors from all other nations that are treaty 
signatories.20 This result is so significant that some advocates of PLR 
legislation disclaim the relationship ol public lending right to copy- 
right law on this basis alone. In Scandinavian countries with PLR 
legislation, the drain of lending right royalties to foreign authors might 
actually worsen the condition of vernacular writers rather than help 
them if the PLR schemes were part of copyright. In nations of the 
European Economic Community, the movement to harmonize the 
copyright laws could also aggravate the purposes of public lending 
right schemes which are considered a part of copyright.“ 
In the United States the doctrine of federal preemption may prove a 
special disadvantage to asserting that PLR legislation is a part of 
copyright protection. The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “To 
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”22 It also provides that the “Constitution, 
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof ...shall be the supreme law of the land.”23 These two constitu- 
tional provisions are the source of the doctrine of federal preemption, a 
doctrine which may prevent states from enacting legislation in areas of 
law occupied by the exercise of powers delegated to the federal govern- 
ment. Thus, the protection for works in their tangible expression 
afforded by the Copyright Act of 1976 could preclude individual states 
from enacting a PLR scheme if i t  is asserted to be a part of copyright law. 
Whether any type of PLR legislation can be enacted by an individual 
state is problematical because of the preemption doctrine. The  problem 
is explored in more detail later. 
In an effort to discourage the passage of any type of PLR legisla- 
tion, opponents generally maintain that there is no  relationship 
between copyright law and authors’ royalties statutes. In general, their 
arguments have been successful, even in those countries where PLR 
legislation has been adopted. Whether a public lending right is a 
conceptual extension of the rights of copyright law will continue to be 
debated. Whatever the outcome of the theoretical arguments, the idea of 
payments made to authors for public library use of their works “reflects 
a sense that the author’s appropriate expectations of reward for his work 
are not properly taken care of by the ordinary economics of the copy- 
right scheme, that somehow the nature of libraries themselves-at least 
as they have come to be developed in some countries-unacceptably 
dilute[s ]  those expectations. ”24 
Public Lending Right in the United States 
A bill introduced in Congress in 1973 requesting a study of the PLR 
concept died in committee without a hearing, and thus ended the first 
legislative test for authors’ royalties legislation in the United States.% 
Investigation of a similar European concept which has met with greater 
acceptance in the United States may indicate how some elements of the 
PLR controversy will likely be received in the lawmaking process. 
In some respects the idea of a public lending right is an extension of 
an older European concept, the droit desuite (art proceeds right), which 
requires the payment of royalties to artists for the resale of their works. 
The  first droit de suite legislation was adopted in France in 1920, and 
similar legislation later gained approval in Germany and Italy.26 
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Although there are differences in the royalty schemes of each country, 
the principle of each law is the same-artists should be compensated for 
each resale of their original works. This compensation is justified not 
only to promote the arts, but also to protect artists from economic 
exploitation by dealers, galleries and collectors. As noted by Monroe 
Price, the notion of protection from economic exploitation is “a vision 
of the starving artist, with his genius unappreciated, using his last 
pennies to purchase canvas and pigments which he turns into a misun- 
derstood masterpie~e.”~~ 
In 1976the California legislatureenacted the Resale Royalties Act2’ 
and became the first state to require the payment of royalties toartists. 
California remains the only state with drozt de suite legislation, 
although similar legislative proposals have been examined in Florida, 
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Texas.29 
Under the California statute, whenever a work of fine art is sold, the 
seller must pay 5 percent of the sale price to the artist provided that the 
sale price exceeds $1000, the artist is alive, and the seller is a state resident 
or the sale takes place in California. Provision is made for the royalty to 
be placed with the California Arts Council if theartist cannot be located. 
“Fine art” is defined by the statute as “an original painting, sculpture or 
drawing.’”’ 
The California statute has been criticized for its technical flaws, 
such as its vague yet narrow definition of fine art and for the difficulty of 
enforcement, as well as for the oversimplification of its underlying 
premise of supporting the arts by marketplace participation in some 
transactions. However, in Morseburg v. Balyon,‘ the first court test of 
the statute, dealers based their refusal to pay the royalty primarily on the 
assertion that the federal Copyright Act preempted California law. 
Federal District Court Judge Takasugi disagreed and, in his decision 
upholding the California law, concluded: 
Not only does the California law not significantly impair any federal 
interest, but it is the very type of innovative lawmaking that our 
federalist system is designed to encourage. The California legislature 
has evidently felt that a need exists to offer further encouragemem to 
and economic protection of artists. That is a decision which the courts 
shall not lightly reverse. An important index of the moral andcultur- 
a1 strength of a people is their official attitude towards, and nurturing 
of, a free and vital community of artists. The California Resale 
Royalties Act may be a small positive step in such a dire~tion.~’ 
The decision was affirmed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where 
the court based its preemption decision solely on the Copyright Act of 
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1909, since the transactions in question occurred before the effective date 
of the 1976 
In Royalties for Artists, a research monograph prepared for the 
Oregon Legislative Administration Committee, Allan Green, director 
of legislative research, notes that those who favor artists’ royalties legis- 
lation argue that: “The California law sets an important precedent for 
support of artists. State legislation will encourage Congress to provide 
royalties for artists on the national level.”34 In fact, federal droitdesui te  
legislation was first introduced in 1965, but the bill languished in 
committee without a hearing through both sessions of the 89th Con- 
gress. In recent years federal royalties legislation has been introduced 
more regularly, perhaps encouraged by state activity. 
The droit de suite and PLR are similar concepts. Both provide 
economic rewards to artists on the basis of transactions in which they no  
longer have an ownership interest in the material item which is the 
subject of the transaction. The droit de suite and PLR provide economic 
protections in addition to those afforded by the general laws of copy-
right. Because an author has a greater set of comprehensive protections 
under the federal law of copyright, there is a greater chance that PLR is 
preempted from state involvement. However, the reasoning of the 
courts in Morseburg applies equally well to the encouragement of 
authors as to artists. 
Conclusion 
As in European countries, the concept of a public lending right 
does not fit neatly into the principles of copyright law in the United 
States. Nonetheless, PLR legislation does address the growing social 
concern of the economic impact of libraries on the livelihood of authors. 
And, if the brief but successful legal development of droit de suite 
legislation in California is an indication, PLR is a workableconcept in 
the U.S. legal structure. 
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